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Abstract

The resource-based view on firm diversification, subsequent to Penrose (1959), has focused
primarily on the fungibility of resources across domains. We make a clear analytical distinction
between scale-free capabilities and those that are subject to opportunity costs and must be
allocated to one use or another, thereby shifting the discourse back to Penrose’s (1959) original
argument regarding the stock of organizational capabilities. The existence of resources and
capabilities that must be allocated across alternative uses implies that profit-maximizing
diversification decisions should be based upon the opportunity cost of their use in one domain or
another. This opportunity cost logic provides a rational explanation for the divergence between
total profits and profit margins. Firms make profit-maximizing decisions to increase total profit
via diversification when the industries in which they are currently competing become relatively
mature. Due to the spreading of these capabilities across more segments, we may observe that
firms' profit-maximizing diversification actions lead to total profit growth but lower average
returns. The model provides an alternative explanation for empirical observations regarding the
diversification discount. The self-selection effect noted in recent work in corporate finance may
not be indicative of inferior capabilities of diversifying firms but of the limited opportunity
contexts in which these firms are operating.
Running Head: Opportunity Costs and Non-Scale Free Capabilities
Keywords: corporate diversification, firm capabilities, opportunity cost, diversification discount,
industry dynanmics, resource view of the firm
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INTRODUCTION
The resource-based view of the firm has long recognized that firms diversify in order to
exploit firm-specific resources1 for which factor markets are imperfect (Penrose, 1959; Teece,
1982). As Mahoney and Pandian (1992) note, this argument is based both upon the availability
of resources, in particular the degree to which there may be slack resources in the firm’s current
market context, as well as implications of the nature of the firm’s resources for the direction of
possible diversification efforts. The diversification literature along the lines of the resource-based
view has largely focused on this latter point highlighting the fungibility of resources, or the
degree to which the value of resources may be diminished as resources are leveraged in settings
more distant from the original context in which the resource (e.g., brand-name or technical
capability) was developed (cf., Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). The fungibility of resources
is the basis for the explanation as to why related diversification tends to outperform unrelated
diversifications and, in turn, why firms tend to pursue more related diversifications (Bettis, 1981;
Markides and Williamson, 1994; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Robins and Wiersema,
1995; Rumelt, 1974).2
Implicitly, and at times explicitly, resources are often treated as having a scale-free
property in the sense that the value of resources is assumed to be not reduced as a result of the
sheer magnitude of firm operations over which they are applied. As Chang (1995: 387) notes,
“The dominant view in diversification research is that intangible resources, such as technology
and marketing skills, encourage firms to diversify into new businesses in order to exploit the
‘public goods’ nature of information-intensive assets.” However, as argued in Penrose (1959),

1

“Resources” and “capabilities” are used interchangeably in this paper.
It is also important to note that owning a more fungible resource does not necessarily lead to competitive
advantage, since it might be in more abundant supply (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988) or attract more
competition (Adner and Zemsky, 2008).
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the stock of a firm's resources and the degree to which they are fungible across product markets
are both critical in determining diversification decisions. Many of the resources that may
underpin a firm’s diversification efforts, such as an effective management team or product
development expertise in a particular domain, have the feature that they are subject to
opportunity costs. At any point in time, these resources must be allocated among alternative
activities, and the use of these resources in one activity precludes their use in other settings.
While some resources, such as a brand name or patent, may have a public good-like quality,
most firm resources or capabilities do not.3 The most familiar example in the business setting is a
firm-specific management team (Slater, 1980). While a superior management team can improve
the productivities across all segments, the team also has to allocate its limited time and attention
(Rosen, 1982).
This issue of the need to allocate capabilities across markets and, as a consequence, the
linking of diversification efforts to demand conditions in alternative markets is highlighted by
Chandler (1969), which maintains that it was the decline in product market activity in the late
1920s and the 1930s that precipitated the enormous growth in diversification of industrial firms
in the U.S. Chandler (1969: 275) submits that firms such as DuPont and General Electric that
“had accumulated vast resources in skilled manpower, facilities, and equipment” were under
great pressure to find new markets as their existing ones ceased to grow.
More generally, as Mahoney and Pandian (1992) point out, there is an important line of
inquiry running from Uzawa (1969), Chandler (1969; 1977), Rubin (1973), Slater (1980), and
Teece (1982) that takes onboard Penrose’s (1959) concern for the dynamics of resource
accumulation by the firm and the implications of these dynamics for diversification efforts. In a
3

Even a resource such as a brand name may not be a pure public good as the application of a brand name for one
product might impact its value in another. Thus, when Gucci wildly applied its brand name to a number of lowerend products in the 1980s, the value of the brand was argued to have been reduced (Aaker, 2004).
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similar vein, Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004) suggest that firms may reallocate resources across
domains over time in order to achieve, what they term, inter-temporal scope economies.
However, the research literature has not been clear about the distinction between scalefree capabilities and those capabilities that must be allocated among alternative uses. This
distinction is critical because we believe that it is this latter class of capabilities that capture the
essence of Penrose’s (1959) arguments regarding diversification. If capabilities are all scale-free,
as is often implicitly assumed in the literature, issues of opportunity costs and resource allocation
are inconsequential, since scale-free capabilities can always be leveraged in other areas and
hence will always have “excess” capacity. Thus, it is only resources subject to an opportunity
cost that affect how resources should optimally be allocated.
In this sense, we are making an analytical return to the original sensibility of Penrose’s
(1959) capability-based perspective on diversification. However, it is important to note that
Penrose (1959) focused on the limit case in which firms had “excess” capabilities. This excess
derives from two possible sources. One stems from the fact that some resources constitute
discrete investments, such as a physical plant. If a manufacturing facility is not being fully
utilized in the production of the firm’s current products, then such a facility can be a free
resource that can be applied, in part, to other means. The other source results from managerial
learning, which enables a given managerial team to handle a greater range of responsibilities
over time. Yet, resources, particularly human capital-based resources, tend to be fully allocated
to particular tasks and initiatives at any point in time. In that sense, such resources are not in
“excess.” However, there still remains the question of what is the best allocation of the time of a
sales force, product development team, or top management group based on their opportunity
costs.

3

In addition to extending Penrose’s (1959) notion of excess resources to the more general
notion of opportunity cost, we incorporate a greater consideration of the role of the demand
environment in influencing the opportunity costs associated with a firm’s resources. The
emphasis in Penrose’s (1959) work was on the internal growth of resources as the source of
excess capacity in the context of demand environment that is implicitly assumed to be static. We
examine how the dynamics of the demand environment influence the allocation of a firm’s
resources, its diversification efforts, and measures of performance. Specifically, since the criteria
of carrying out an activity are based upon the opportunity cost of applying capabilities in one
domain or another (Rubin, 1973; Slater, 1980), a complete account of excess capacity of
capabilities should take into account not only internal growth in firm-specific capabilities but
also the change in external opportunities across different markets. Underutilized capacity
becomes available when the growth opportunities in the current market cannot keep pace with
the internal growth of capabilities. The maturity of the current market relative to other potential
markets could either reduce the value of applying non-scale free capabilities in the current
market or raise the opportunity cost of not applying some of these capabilities in related product
markets.4 It is in this sense that resources become “underutilized” or “excess.” Alternatively, if
the current market continues to offer sufficiently favorable opportunities, it will not be
economically rational to divert non-scale free resources into other industries as long as there is
any imperfect fungibility in the value of capabilities when applied to other domains.
Building on these issues concerning firms’ internal resource base and their external
product market environment, we develop a basic economic model that provides a rational

4

The relative maturity of the current market could arise either from the decline of the current market or from the fast
growth of other markets. An example of the former case is the defense industry after the mid-1980s (Anand and
Singh, 1997), while an example of the latter case is the mature desktop PC market in comparison with the rapidly
growing hand-held device market.
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explanation of firms’ diversification behavior in trading off profit margins for corporate growth.
Largely ignored by the research literature is the fact that profit-maximizing diversification
decisions imply that firms seek to increase total profit but not necessarily their profit margin or
market-to-book value, with the latter two measures being among the more common performance
measures used in the diversification literature (Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). Firms make
rational decisions to increase total profit via diversification when the industries in which they are
currently competing become relatively mature. In this process, however, firms need to allocate
their non-scale free resources away from the current business to the new one. Due to the
spreading of these capabilities across more segments, we may observe that firms' profitmaximizing diversification actions lead to total profit growth but lower average returns. In a
similar vein, Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) show that a wider level of diversification can
lead to lower average rents (Tobin’s q) due to the imperfect fungibility of firm-specific factors.
We find that the decline in average returns may arise from the reallocation of capabilities to new
product markets, even in the absence of any imperfect fungibility of firm-specific capabilities.
We first examine this model in a simple Bertrand set-up in which we demonstrate the
basic result regarding the implication of profit maximizing diversification on profit margins. We
then expand this to a Cournot model that allows for a more explicit treatment of competition. In
the Cournot setting, we can generate cross-sectional results in which a firm with inferior
capabilities remains focused on a single product market and earns higher profit margins, but less
profit, than its more capable competitor. We also find that as firms become more asymmetric in
their capabilities, the necessary size of the new product market to elicit diversification on the part
of the more capable firm rises. With greater asymmetry in capabilities, the original market in
which both firms compete becomes more attractive, thereby diminishing the incentive to

5

diversify. Thus, the Cournot results allow us to expand the considerations of competitive effects
and also demonstrate the robustness of our original results to those effects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section further develops the
notion of non-scale free capabilities that must be allocated among alternative uses and its
contrast with scale-free capabilities. We then set up and analyze the formal model by linking
capability-based arguments regarding diversification and the demand conditions in the markets
in which the firm does and may participate. After developing some general results under
Bertrand and Cournot competition for the relationship among diversification decisions, firms’
capabilities, and profit margins, we engage in a numeric analysis of the Cournot model to further
develop the implications of competitive forces on both diversification decisions and profit
margins. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of these results.

OPPORTUNITY COST AND DIVERSIFICATION
------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------Table 1 illustrates the contrast between what we term scale-free capabilities and those
resources that are congestible and require allocation to distinct purposes. In addition to this
dimension by which capabilities may differ, there is the more traditional issue of fungibility, or
the range of activities over which a resource or capability may be applied. The most restricted
sort of resources resides in the lower left cell. Highly specific human or physical capital not only
has the property that its specificity narrows the domain of activities over which the resource can
be applied, but also that its use in one activity constrains its possible use in other activities. The
cell in the upper left again offers human and physical capital examples, but in this case the
capital is applicable over a wider domain of activities. While an auditor may not be usefully
6

applied in a marketing function, he or she can apply their auditing expertise to a wide variety of
enterprises. Similarly, power generation equipment is a general purpose capital infrastructure
that could be applied to an enormous range of uses. However, per the issue of opportunity cost, it
is important to note that the use of an auditor in one engagement restricts their possible use in
another; and the application of a certain magnitude of kilowatts to one purpose reduces the
kilowatts available for another. In the right-hand side, the resources are not subject to
opportunity cost. There are no inherent constraints on how many goods or services can bear a
common brand name. Nor does the use of a computer program on one machine preclude its use
on another.5 While the fungibility of a brand name or computer operating system is not limitless,
the range of application is generally greater than either a specific piece of intellectual property or
the range of uses of a particular customer relationship.
The extant research literature on diversification has tended to focus on scale-free
capabilities, such as technical know-how and reputation, which lead to economies of scope or
synergies in the diversification process because they “display some of the characteristics of a
public good in that it may be used in many different non-competing applications without its
value in any one application being substantially impaired” (Teece, 1980: 226). The recognition
of scale-free capabilities has had a profound influence on both academic research and industry
practice, since it highlights the role of knowledge and competence as strategic assets (Winter,
1987). Winter and Szulanski’s (2001) study of replication processes provides a paradigmatic
example of a scale-free capability, defining the Arrow core as the informational endowment a
firm extracts from an original setting which can be replicated to other settings. The distinctive
property of such information-like resource is that “unlike any resource that is rivalrous in use, an
5

The producer may restrict the replication of the program through site licenses or copy restrictions but clearly such
constraints are to address issues of value appropriation and are not related to technological constraints to the
application of a given program to multiple applications.
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information-like resource is infinitely leverageable…it does not have to be withdrawn from one
use to be applied to another” (Winter and Szulanski, 2001: 741).
The critical constraint in the application of scale-free resources is not by definition the
scale of the operations over which they are applied, but rather the scope or range of their
applicability. Indeed, the issue of resource relatedness and fungibility is arguably the most
studied question in corporate strategy. Rumelt (1974), in a pioneering examination of this issue,
showed that firms pursuing related diversifications outperform those pursuing a strategy of
unrelated diversification. This basic finding has been reconsidered with a variety of different
measures of relatedness, but the general result has stood up (Bettis, 1981; Markides and
Williamson, 1994; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Robins and Wiersema, 1995).
While Penrose’s (1959) emphasis on a firm’s stock of capabilities as a basis for
diversification has played a secondary role to the consideration of the fungibility of resources,
there has been some awareness in the literature that there may be opportunity costs associated
with the use of resources. In his brief discussion on the limits to diversification economies, Teece
(1982: 53) suggests that, “Know-how is generally not embodied in blueprints alone; the human
factor is critically important in technology transfer. Accordingly, as the demands for sharing
know-how increase, bottlenecks in the form of over-extended scientists, engineers, and managers
can be anticipated.” Recent empirical work in both finance and management has provided
suggestive evidence of the opportunity cost of allocating resources from one product domain to
another. Schoar (2002) finds that after a firm diversifies into a new industry by acquiring a plant,
the incumbent plants will incur a decrease in productivity, while the acquired plants increase
productivity. Similarly, Roberts and McEvily (2005) find that entering a new pharmaceutical
product market reduces a firm’s performance in its current markets. Finally, Hitt et al. (1991:
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695) observe that acquisitions tend to reduce both the extent and productivity of firms’ R&D
investments, suggesting that the “resources remaining for managerial allocation may become
constrained, causing managers to forgo other investment opportunities.”
Consider the following example of these arguments. As the strongest player in the
microprocessor industry, Intel has been experiencing sluggish growth in the PC microprocessor
market due to saturated demand and increasing competition from Advanced Micro Devices. In
order to spur growth, Intel has sought to extend its reach beyond the PC microprocessor industry
into mobile phones and consumer electronics. The maturity of the PC microprocessor market has
made the opportunities of using its capabilities in other industries more attractive, and,
correspondingly, the opportunity cost of staying focused has risen. At the same time,
diversification requires Intel to allocate its scarce resources into these new segments.
Consequently, our theory would predict that, on the whole, Intel’s diversification efforts will
increase sales and total profit. However, its average return will decline, reflecting both the
shifting away of firm-specific resources from the development and manufacturing of
microprocessors for PCs and the possible reduced efficacy of these same resources in the related
product markets into which the firm is diversifying.6
Based upon the above reasoning, we develop the following arguments regarding
diversification efforts. First, it is important to distinguish between diversification efforts based on
scale-free and non-scale free capabilities. A scale-free resource, such as brand name, faces limits
on the breadth of its fungibility (i.e., how broadly fungible is a given brand name) but not on its
extent of application (i.e., the number of markets in which a given brand can be applied for a
given level of fungibility). In contrast, the application of those non-scale free capabilities is
6

Of course, another basis for the decline in average return is the shift from a market in which Intel has a dominant
position to markets that may be more competitive; however, the fact that Intel is entering these more competitive,
but more rapidly growing, markets is further testimony to the need to reallocate non-scale free capabilities.
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driven by the logic of opportunity costs. On the margin, is the greatest value of these firmspecific capabilities realized within the current product market context or in diversifying to a
new context? This opportunity cost is, in turn, importantly affected by the size, growth, and
competitive conditions in alternative product markets. Thus, when there are multiple segments,
the range of diversification activity is constrained by the total stock of capabilities. This analysis
supplements the insight in the strategy literature that the imperfect fungibility of scale-free
capabilities restricts corporate scope (e.g., Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988).
This analysis also provides new insights into the diversification discount, the observation
that diversified firms tend to have a lower valuation, typically measured as the relationship
between market value to book value or Tobin’s q, than an amalgamation of an equivalent set of
focused firms (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). Agency theorists suggest that
diversification destroys value for reasons such as managers’ empire building behavior that aims
to increase their own status, power, and pecuniary compensation (e.g., Jensen, 1986). Recently,
however, there has been a growing literature in the corporate finance field suggesting that a
diversification discount arises even when firms are value maximizers. Econometrically
sophisticated analyses of the profitability of diversified firms (e.g., Campa and Kedia, 2002;
Villalonga, 2004) indicate that there is something systematically different about firms that
diversify. It is this endogenous selection into the act of diversification, rather than diversification
per se, that leads to diversification discount:
“… the failure to control for firm characteristics that lead firms to diversify and be
discounted may wrongly attribute the discount to diversification instead of the underlying
characteristics. For example, consider a firm facing technological change, which
adversely affects its competitive advantage in its industry. This poorly performing firm
will trade at a discount relative to other firms in the industry. Such a firm will also have
lower opportunity costs of assigning its scarce resources in other industries, and this
might lead it to diversify. If poorly performing firms tend to diversify, then not taking
into account past performance and its effect on the decision to diversify will result in
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attributing the discount to diversification activity, rather than to the poor performance of
the firm.” (Campa and Kedia, 2002: 1732)
In existing analytical explanations of this empirical finding that, controlling for
endogeniety in diversification behavior, there is no diversification discount (e.g., Gomes and
Livdan, 2004), the act of diversification is interpreted as a “signal” that the firm has relatively
few ex-ante capabilities and is diversifying due to the correspondingly low rates of return in its
initial markets. In the presence of diminishing returns to production, firms with lower
productivity will reach their optimal size in the incumbent segment at a lower size level than
those firms with higher productivity and, as a result, firms with lower productivity are more
likely to diversify.
We agree with these recent empirical findings that there is something systematic about
those firms that “sort” themselves into a positive diversification decision. However, the above
analytical explanation is not fully consistent with the well-evidenced proposition in the strategy
field that firms with more relevant capabilities (R&D or marketing capabilities) tend to enter a
new field earlier and perform better (e.g., Helfat, 2003; Klepper and Simons, 2000; Mitchell,
1989). In contrast, in the spirit of the long-standing treatment of diversification in the strategy
literature, we suggest that the “something different” is not that these firms are a “bad type” and
are lacking in capabilities. Rather, these are firms with relatively superior capabilities; and the
bad “signal” may be a statement about the market contexts in which these firms are operating,
such as demand maturity, rather than a statement about the firm’s relative lack of capabilities.7 In
the pursuit of the best use of the firm’s non-scale free resources, there is some allocation of

7

The recent treatments of the diversification discount such as Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) do
control for industry demand conditions when examining the self-selection effect of the act of diversification on the
so-called diversification discount. However, due to data limitations, such work must rely on measures of industry at
the four-digit level of the SIC code. This level of aggregation masks considerable diversity of demand environments
at the product level. We elaborate on this issue in the discussion section.
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resources away from established markets and, at the sacrifice of profit margins but not total
profits, a shift of these resources to new markets. Thus, both our model and those developed in
the corporate finance literature are consistent with the empirical finding regarding the
diversification “discount”; however, the two explanations differ in their predictions as to which
firms (more or less capable) are likely to be more or less diversified.

MODEL STRUCTURE
We model a firm’s diversification decision with regard to two market segments indexed
by m (The initial segment m  I and the new segment m  N ). Production in each segment is
described as Qm   m t mTk m , where  m is the firm’s scale-free capabilities, t m is the share of the
firm’s total non-scale free capabilities, T , that must be divided among activities, and capital k m
whose replacement cost per unit is r which reflects the current market value of capital. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that firms are endowed with a particular capability stock T and do
not consider the cost of developing this, but only the opportunity cost of how it is applied across
different market segments within the firm. The amount of k m needed to produce Qm , given t m , is
therefore

Qm
rQm
, with total cost
 cm  Qm , where
 m t mT
 m t mT
cm 

r
 m t mT

(1)

Note that (i) scale-free capabilities,  m , and non-scale free capabilities, T , are firm
specific and subject to imperfect input markets (Teece, 1982); (ii) providing more of capabilities
reduces both total and marginal cost since it substitutes for the purchased capital; (iii) cm is
decreasing in t m and increases to infinity as t m approaches zero; (iv) we specify the following
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relationship between scale-free capabilities in the two markets:  N  (1   ) I . This relationship
implies that scale-free capabilities,  I , are not perfectly fungible, and that the effectiveness of
scale-free capabilities,  I , diminishes by a factor  ( 0    1 ) when  I is applied to the new
segment N.8
It is important to relate this production function and associated cost function to our
underlying argument regarding scale-free and non-scale free capabilities. Our focus is on the
allocation of non-scale-free capabilities across market contexts. This capability could be a
product development team that might be spread across multiple initiatives, as highlighted in
Christensen and Bower’s (1996) work on the disk drive industry, the allocation of scarce
production capacity as in Burgleman’s (1994) work on Intel, or the attention of the top
management team (Rosen, 1982). For the sake of simplicity, we are not addressing this
allocation with respect to the scale of activity within a given business unit. Thus, a business unit
is assumed to be able to scale up its activity at a constant marginal cost. This simplification
follows on the works of Klepper (1996) and Lippman and Rumelt (1982) on industry evolution,
which, in order to highlight the effect of across-firm heterogeneity, postulate a production
technology with a constant marginal cost of production. This assumption of constant return to
production scale also allows us to demonstrate that diversification can arise from the change in
demand conditions in the absence of diminishing return to production scale, in contrast to recent
work in corporate finance (cf., Gomes and Livdan, 2004; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002) in
which diminishing returns to production scale acts as an underlying driver for diversification.

8

As we point out in Table 1, non-scale free capabilities are also subject to the issue of imperfect fungibility, but the
distinctive feature of non-scale free capabilities is that they must be allocated across alternative uses based on
opportunity costs. In order to highlight the issue of allocation, we assume that non-scale free capabilities are
perfectly fungible; however, so that the model more closely corresponds to Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988), we
allow for the scale-free capability to have imperfect fungibility across alternative uses.
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We denote the demand and price for a given firm’s product in segment m as qm and pm
respectively. Should the firm engage in both activities, its profit is qI ( pI  cI )  qN ( pN  cN ) or
qI ( pI 

r
r
)  qN ( pN 
) . Assuming the optimal t I and t N are both strictly positive, the
 I tI T
 N tN T

firm’s problem is:
max{( pI qI  p N q N )  r (

q
qI
r
r
 N ) | t I  t N  1,
 pN , and
 pI } (2)
 I tI T  N t N T
 N tN T
 I tI T

Note that it may not be optimal for the firm to engage in both activities simultaneously.
Furthermore, if it is optimal for the firm to be diversified into both activities, then the optimal
allocations of non-scale-free capabilities t I* and t N* are bounded away from zero. That is, to get
into the new activity requires a discrete reduction in the capabilities employed in the initial
activity. Indeed, depending on the magnitude of the firm’s capabilities and the market price, a
firm may not be competitively viable in a given market.
This above setting offers a general framework for analyzing firms’ diversification
decisions and the associated performance effects based on (non-scale-free) capability allocation.
In the following sections, we examine the diversification problem characterized in this general
framework using the two most widely used market models: the Bertrand model and the Cournot
model, which usefully complement each other. The Bertrand analysis allows us to develop the
basic insights regarding the allocation of scarce capabilities across lines of business and its
implications for firm profitability. Introducing Cournot competition allows us to examine more
directly the impact of competitive interaction among firms. However, the Cournot analysis in
this context does not lend itself to a full closed form analytical solution as the reaction functions
are neither continuous nor monotonic. Thus, we analytically derive the general results regarding
firm diversification decisions, and then perform a numerical analysis to characterize more
14

specific properties regarding profit margins and the pattern of diversification. Further, we
analyze a wide array of parameter values to both explore further insights of the model and the
robustness of our results.

ANALYSIS: Bertrand Model
Each market is specified to be a Bertrand duopoly, where whenever the firm allocates
non-scale-free capabilities such that its marginal cost is lower than that of the competitor, the
firm serves the whole market with demand. The demand side of segment m consists of
sm consumers. Thus, the firm that captures the market produces quantity qm  sm , charges a price
of pm equal to the competitor’s marginal cost, and has profits sm ( pm  cm ) , where cm 

r
is
 m t mT

defined as in equation (1).
In this Bertrand setting, a given firm diversifies into the new segment when demand
conditions are such that the maximization problem (2) has an interior solution (t I* , t N* ) . The total
profit associated with the diversification strategy is sI ( pI 

r
r
)  sN ( pN  * ) , andthe total
*
 I tI T
 N tNT

sales associated with the diversification strategy is pI sI  pN sN . Therefore, the profit margin
associated with the diversification strategy, which we denote as  * , is

* 

sN
sI
r
r
( pI 
)
( pN 
)
*
 I Tt I
(1   ) I Tt N*
p I sI  p N s N
pI s I  p N s N

(3)
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sI ( pI 
In contrast, when firms focus on the initial segment, the profit margin is

r
)
 IT

pI sI

,

r
)
(1   ) I T
.
pN sN

sN ( pN 
while when firms focus on the new segment the profit margin is

Therefore, the weighted average of the profit margin of the two focus strategies, which we
denote as  w , with relative sales

w 

pN sN
pI sI
and
as the respective weights, is
pI sI  pN sN
pI sI  pN sN

sN
sI
r
r
( pI 
)
( pN 
)
 I T pI sI  pN sN
(1   ) I T
pI sI  pN sN

(4)

 w is a standard benchmark used to compare the performance of diversified and focused
firms (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). The relation between the profit margin of
the diversification strategy (equation (3)) and that of focused strategies (equation (4)) is
characterized by equation (5).

*  w 2

sI s N

r

pI sI  p N s N

(1   ) I T

(5)

As a result, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The profit margin of the profit-maximizing diversification strategy for a firm with
capability stock T is lower than the weighted average of the profit margin of focusing this
capability stock T in each of the two markets. The difference is characterized by equation (5).
(See Appendix 1 for a proof.)
Proposition 1 allows us to identify the sources of the declining profit margin associated
with diversification by decomposing the profit margin of the diversification strategy into two
parts: the weighted average of the two focus strategies and the discount due to the spreading of
non-scale-free capabilities. The second term of  w in equation (4) indicates how the profit
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margin of the diversification strategy declines with  the degree to which the effectiveness of
scale-free capabilities diminishes in the new segment. This is the case studied in Montgomery
and Wernerfelt (1988) who account for a decline in profit margin or Tobin’s q as firms apply,
what we term, scale-free capabilities in increasingly distant markets.
Adding to this consideration of imperfect fungibility, the second term of equation (5)
captures the discount due to the spreading of non-scale-free capabilities. Therefore, equation (5)
provides a more complete picture of the diversification discount from the resource-based view by
incorporating the effect of non-scale-free resources that need to be allocated across applications.
Proposition 1 suggests that the existence of a diversification discount does not necessarily result
from agency behavior that deviates from profit maximization. The spreading of non-scale-free
capabilities across more applications based on opportunity costs implies that the profit margin
will be “sacrificed” to some extent in the pursuit of total profit maximization.
In parallel to this discussion of the impact of diversification on the firm’s profit margins,
we can also show that rational diversification efforts lead to lower Tobin’s q, a widely used
measure in the empirical analysis of diversification performance. Given that there is no short-run
variable production cost (e.g., depreciation and labor) in the model, the market value of the firm
in this stylized one-period model can be represented by operating profit p m s m , which is the
earnings stream that is generated from the firm’s capital stock of r

sm
. Therefore, Tobin’s q,
 mT

defined as the market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost of capital (Lindenberg
and Ross, 1981; Winter, 1995), can be represented as q 

pm sm
.
s
r m
 mT
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We denote the Tobin’s q associated with the diversification strategy as qDIV and the
Tobin’s q associated with the weighted average of two focused strategies as qFOC . Analogous to
the relationship in equation (5), the ratio of qFOC and qDIV is

qFOC
qDIV

sI s N
1 
 1
s
sI  N
1 
2

(6)

As a result, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The Tobin’s q of the profit-maximizing diversification strategy for a firm with
capability stock T is lower than the weighted average of the Tobin’s q of focusing this capability
stock T in each of the two markets. The difference, in ratio terms, is characterized by equation (6).
(See Appendix 2 for a proof.)
Therefore, whether the average return to capital is measured as economic profit margin
(equation (5)) or as Tobin’s q (equation (6)), we see that profit-maximizing diversification leads
to a reduction in these common measures of firm performance due to the spreading of firm
resources over multiple product markets.

ANALYSIS: Cournot Model
The prior analysis examined the profit maximizing tradeoff between total profits and
profit margins based on a Bertrand model. This analysis models the diversification of a focal
firm that faces competitive constraints, but does not explicitly model an endogenous competitive
process. In this section, we address this gap by introducing a model of Cournot competition. We
develop this analysis using the same analytical structure for firms’ capabilities and their
associated cost functions, but the Cournot structure requires us to more fully specify a demand
function.
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Demand in the initial market is specified as: pI  aI  bI (q1I  q2 I ) , where q1I and q2 I are
the output of firms 1 and 2 in the initial market. Similarly, in the new market, demand is:
pN  aN  bN (q1N  q2 N ) , where q1N and q2 N are the output of firms 1 and 2 in the new market.
As

before

(equation

(1)),

firms

are

characterized

by

their

non-scale-free

capability T1 and T2 , respectively. However, we set the value of scale-free capabilities  for the
two competitors to be the same as we are focusing on the role of non-scale-free capabilities. The
marginal production costs for firms 1 and 2 in market I and N are given by c1I 

c2 I 

1

 t2 I T2

, c1N 

1
,
 t1I T1

1
1
, and c2 N 
, where t1I and t2 I are the
(1   ) (1  t1I )T1
(1   ) (1  t2 I )T2

fraction of non-scale-free capability of firms 1 and 2 invested on the initial market, respectively,
and (1   ) is the effectiveness of scale-free capabilities,  , when  is applied to the new
segment N ( 0    1 ). Thus, firms’ profits in each market are given by  im  ( pm  cim )qim , for
i  1, 2; m  I , N .

The sequencing of the firms’ choice problem is that firms first choose their non-scale-free
capability allocations, characterized by t1I and t2 I . Second, given the chosen t1I and t2 I , firms
choose their production quantities q1I and q2 I in the initial market and q1N and q2 N in the new
market. The associated optimization problem can be well specified via backward induction.
However, in this context, the problem does not lend itself to a general analytical solution. Indeed,
we will show in the subsequent analysis that the best-response functions that underpin the
equilibrium analysis may, in some cases, be non-continuous and non-monotonic.9

9

In this respect, it is worth noting that our model is related to but distinct from a classic IO model developed by
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), which showed that a two-stage model of production capacity investment followed by
Bertrand price competition can be treated in a relatively straightforward manner as being equivalent to a one-stage
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The best response curves are not continuous for two reasons. First, the optimal
allocations of non-scale-free capabilities are bounded away from zero, i.e., to get into the new
activity requires a discrete reduction in the capabilities employed in the initial activity. It would
never be optimal for a firm to allocate less than some epsilon to the new market. The firm must
allocate sufficient capabilities into the new market such that it can establish competitive viability
in this market. Furthermore, the firm must make sure the gains in the new market to which these
capabilities are being applied is larger than the losses incurred by allocating these
capabilities away from the old market. As a result, the best response curve always has a jump
from zero at the point of diversification to some discrete magnitude.
The second reason that the best response curves may not be continuous is that the best
response curves have small jumps at the point where the competitor either makes a discrete move
into or out of a product market in response to its competitor’s change in allocation of capabilities
across markets. Note that this second reason for the best response curves not being continuous is
also the reason why the best response curves are not monotonic (see Appendix 3 for an
illustration of the above argument and some more detailed explanation).
Even in the presence of the analytical challenges identified above, we are still able to
derive the following propositions. To capture the change in relative demand, without loss of

model of Cournot competition. The first-stage decision variable is production capacity in Kreps and Scheinkman’s
model, but in the context of our model it is the allocation of capabilities. The allocated capabilities determine the
level of average cost in a given market (see equation (2) on p. 13). Also, in contrast to Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983), we assume there is no constraint to production capacity and thus production capacity can scale up
simultaneously with the output decision. Under this specification, the sequencing of the firms’ choice problem is
that firms first choose their non-scale free capability allocations, which in turn determine firms’ cost level in each
market. Second, given the chosen capability allocations and the associated cost levels, firms either choose their
prices, if under the Bertrand competition, or choose production quantities, if under Cournot competition. The firm’s
optimization problem can then be analyzed via backward induction. In sum, our model differs from Kreps and
Scheinkman’s model in two important ways. First, Kreps and Scheinkman’s (1983) model examines only one
market, while we model the allocation of capabilities across multiple markets along with diversification decisions.
Second, Kreps and Scheinkman’s (1983) model examines Cournot competition assuming homogeneous firm
capabilities, while our model examines how capabilities in each market are endogenously determined prior to
Cournot competition.
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generality, we hold constant the size of the initial market aI and only vary the size of the new
market aN . Let P1  P ( aN , T1 , T2 , t1I , t2 I ) be firm 1’s profit function given the new market size
aN , firm 1’s capability T1 , the competitor firm 2’s capability T2 , firm 1’s allocation t1I , and the
competitor firm 2’s allocation t2 I . Similarly, P2  P (aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I , t1I ) represents firm 2’s profit
function given the new market size aN , firm 2’s capability T2 , the competitor firm 1’s capability
T1 , firm 2’s allocation t2 I , and the competitor firm 1’s allocation t1I . We use t1I* and t2I* to
denote firms’ allocation in equilibrium. Given an initial setting ( aN  0 ) in which both firms
compete in the initial market, we are able to state the following propositions:
Proposition 2a: For i  1, 2 , there exists an aˆ N  0,  0, and   0 , such that, when the
size of the new market aN gets sufficiently large but not too large ( aˆ N  aN  aˆ N   ) and the two
firms’ capability asymmetry is small enough ( Ti  T(3i )   ), there exists a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in which either firm may first diversify ( t(3* i ) I  1 ) while the other firm stays focused
at the initial market ( tiI*  1 ).
Proposition 2b: For i  1, 2 , fixing Ti as the less capable firm’s capability level, there

exists a T  0 , aN  0 , and   0 such that, when the size of the new market aN gets sufficiently


large ( aN  aN  aN   ) and when the two firms’ capability asymmetry is sufficiently large
( T  T ), there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which only the more capable
(3i )

firm will first diversify ( 0  t(3* i ) I  1 ) while the less capable firm stays focused at the initial
market ( tiI*  1 ).
Proposition 2c: For i  1, 2 , given a I as the size of the initial market and T3i as the more
capable firm’s capability level, there exists T  0 such that the firm without sufficient
capabilities ( 0  Ti  T ) will either focus on the initial market ( tiI*  1 ) or switch all resources
from one market to the other ( tiI*  0 ) in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
(See Appendix 4 for proofs.)
These three propositions highlight how firms’ diversification decisions differ when the
size of the new market increases, depending on their capability asymmetry. Proposition 2a
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highlights the role of competitive conditions being endogenous on the reallocation of resources
across product markets. In this case, when one firm diversifies to take advantage of the new
market opportunity, the current market becomes more attractive as the diversifying firm
withdraws capabilities from this market. Therefore, there exists an equilibrium in which either
the more capable firm or the less capable diversifies first while the other firm stays focused on
the initial market. 10 In addition, it is not an equilibrium for both firms to start diversifying
simultaneously as the relative demand changes, even when these two firms have equal
capabilities.
However, while Proposition 2a provides a baseline result when firms are relatively
symmetric, the core issue that is of primary interest to the strategy field is when firms are, to a
significant degree, asymmetric in their capabilities. Proposition 2b demonstrates that with
sufficient asymmetry in capabilities, there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which the
more capable firm diversifies first. In this case, for the more capable firm, the need to reallocate
capabilities to the new market due to opportunity costs dominates the strategic consideration of
waiting for the less capable firm to diversify first and thus alleviate competition in the initial
segment.
Proposition 2(c) indicates that a minimum amount of capabilities are necessary for the
diversification strategy ever to be the optimal strategy, irrespective of relative demand conditions
across alternative markets. When relative demand changes, the more capable firm goes through a
diversification process; however, without sufficient capabilities, the less capable firm may never
become diversified. It will focus on the initial market when the relative market size of the new
10

There could be two pure strategy Nash equilibria in Proposition 2a ( (tiI*  1,0  t(3*  i ) I  1) or (tiI*  1, t(3*  i ) I  0) ).

However, in either case, Proposition 2a holds. Either firm can diversify first (diversify partly into the new market
(0  t(3*  i ) I  1) or completely switch to the new market (t(3*  i ) I  0) ), while the other firm stays focused in the initial
market (tiI*  1) .

22

market is small. When the relative market size of the new market gets larger, the less capable
firm may completely switch to the new market but will never simultaneously engage both
markets. This proposition further highlights the critical role of non-scale-free resources in
determining the scope of the firm.
In the following numerical analysis, we examine more fully the impact of asymmetry of
capabilities on the diversification decisions and, in particular, the threshold of relative size of the
new and the initial market that triggers diversification. In addition, we examine the impact on
profit margins of diversification. This analysis not only generalizes Proposition 1 to the Cournot
case, but it allows us to examine the cross-sectional implications of diversification behavior on
the profit margins for firms with varying capability levels.

NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE INTERACTION
For our numerical analysis, we set the baseline parameter values as follows: a I  10 ,
bI  b N  1 ,

scale-free

capabilities

 1 ,

and

the

fungibility

of

scale-free

capabilities (1   )  0.8 . In the subsequent analysis, we highlight the impact of varying levels of
firm capabilities and market size ( a N , the size of the new market). This later variable allows us
to capture relative demand maturity based on the increase in the size of the new market a N .11
Holding constant the new market and varying the initial market would lead to the same results.
Implications of numerical investigation for diversification decisions
In the Cournot analysis, we are able to analytically show that when two firms’ capability
asymmetry is sufficiently large and the new market size is of sufficient size, the more capable
Note that while we keep scale-free capabilities  and their fungibility (1   ) in the model to stay connected with
the existing literature, we do not explore these two parameters in the analysis since the focus of this paper is nonscale free capabilities. See MacDonald and Ryall (2004: 1330-1331) and Adner and Zemsky (2008) for analytical
examinations of scale-free capabilities and the effect of their fungibility on profitability.

11
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firm will diversify first while the less capable firm stays focused on the initial market. Building
on this property, we conduct the following numerical analysis to examine how the demand
threshold to diversify changes with the degree of capability asymmetry. In so doing, we identify
some interesting competitive effects of asymmetry in firms’ capabilities.
----------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
----------------------------------In Figure 1, aN is the demand threshold where the more capable firm (with
capabilities T1 ) first chooses to diversify, while the less capable firm (with capabilities T2 ) is still
focused. The downward movement along a given curve captures the “capacity effect,” meaning
that as the focal firm's own capabilities ( T1 ) increase, its threshold to diversify becomes smaller,
or firm 1 reaches the threshold to diversify earlier. The shift in curves from square ( T2  1.5 ) to
diamond ( T2  0.5 ) captures the “competition effect,” meaning that as the competitor's
capabilities ( T2 ) decrease, the threshold for the more capable firm (with capabilities T1 ) to start
diversifying becomes greater. This means that the more capable firm diversifies later (for a larger
size of the new market), since the current market becomes more attractive.

Implications of numerical investigation for profit margin and diversification
Having characterized diversification behavior under Cournot competition, we now
address the central results regarding the impact of diversification on profit margins. In particular,
the numerical analysis examines whether Proposition 1 regarding the tradeoff between total
profits and profit margins holds under Cournot competition.
In Proposition 1, under the Bertrand setting, we compare the profit margin of a
diversified firm with a hypothetical benchmark of the weighted average of the firm focusing
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separately on the two markets. However, in the Bertrand setting, since there is essentially a
single firm, we cannot make cross-sectional comparisons of firms with heterogeneous
capabilities. The following analysis in the Cournot setting addresses this issue. With the same
baseline parameter values of a I  10 , bI  bN  1 , 1    0.8 , we let the more capable firm have
capabilities T1  2 and the less capable one have capabilities T2  1.5 .
----------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
----------------------------------Examining profit margins as the size of the new market varies we see a number of
interesting properties (Figure 2). First, consistent with Proposition 1, for both the more and less
capable firm, there is a substantial drop in profit margin when the relative demand level in the
new market passes the threshold sufficient to elicit diversification and market entry. Second,
consistent with Proposition 2, given the significant heterogeneity in capabilities the first firm to
diversify is the more capable firm. In the interim range of market demand for which it is optimal
for the high-capability firm to diversify but for the low-capability firm to remain focused on the
initial market, we see that the more capable firm may end up with a lower profit margin than the
less capable firm.12 A firm’s rational diversification decision is driven by its pursuit of profit
maximization rather than profit margin maximization. Thus, profit margin may not be a good
proxy indicator for differences in capabilities among firms that vary in their degree of
diversification.
Another finding is that while both firms’ profit margins drop substantially when the
relative demand level in the new market passes the threshold sufficient to elicit diversification,
their profit margins will gradually increase as the relative demand grows further. Moreover,
12

Two working papers show a similar result by assuming multiple equal-sized markets that are perfectly
competitive (Santalo, 2002) or monopolistically competitive (Nocke and Yeaple, 2008).
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when the demand level in the new market reaches a level sufficient for the low-capability firm to
diversify as well, we see the cross-sectional property that one generally intuits that the more
capable firm earns a higher profit margin.
Finally, note that if the capability differences among the two firms is rather extreme, it
may be the case that the more capable firm maintains a higher profit margin for all demand
environments, even in that intermediate level of new market demand that generates
diversification behavior on the part of the more capable firm but a focus on the original market
on the part of the less capable firm. Figure 3 provides an illustration of this with: a I  10 ,
bI  bN  1 , 1    0.8 , T1  2 , T2  0.5 .
----------------------------------Insert Figure 3 about here
-----------------------------------

DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS OF OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND DIVERSIFICATION
While the contemporary literature on diversification from a resource-based view builds
upon the idea of excess firm capabilities developed in Penrose (1959), the emphasis has been on
the fungibility of resources across domains. Making a clear analytical distinction between scalefree capabilities and those that are subject to opportunity costs and must be allocated to one use
or another helps to shift the discourse back to Penrose’s (1959) focus on the stock of
organizational capabilities. The existence of non-scale free capabilities implies that profitmaximizing diversification decisions should be based on the opportunity cost of their use in one
domain or another, which is in turn determined by the relative size of different market segments
and the degree to which the effectiveness of capabilities diminishes across markets. We further
identify the demand thresholds for firms to diversify as a function of their capabilities, which
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allows us to infer the effect of heterogeneous capabilities on the order of diversification in the
face of competitive interactions. The recognition of capabilities that must be allocated across
multiple segments based on opportunity costs also provides a profit-maximizing explanation for
the divergence between total profits and profit margins and in turn an alternative explanation of
the diversification discount.
Our developed model suggests an alternative self-selection mechanism that can account
for the observation of a cross-sectional diversification discount (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang
and Stulz, 1994). Firms with superior capabilities in a low-value existing market context enhance
their profits by diversifying, but at the same time incur lower average return due to the spread of
non-scale free capabilities across applications. Therefore, it may not be, as suggested by Gomes
and Livdan (2004), that those firms with fewer capabilities (lower productivity) diversify first
and this sorting of “bad types” into diversification events explains the observed cross-sectional
diversification discount; rather, it could be that those firms with more capabilities diversify first
and that this diversification activity decreases average returns.
In this sense, our model can help reconcile the conflict between the existing self-selection
explanations that rely on the assumptions of comparative productivity differences and
diminishing returns to production scale (low productivity firms diversifying first) and the
proposition well established in the strategy field that firms with more relevant capabilities tend to
enter a new field earlier (e.g., Klepper and Simons, 2000; Mitchell, 1989). Critical to our
argument is the opportunity cost of applying non-scale free capabilities in less favorable
opportunities. Our argument suggests that diversifying firms are “good types” (i.e., high
capabilities) operating in “bad” market contexts.
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This argument suggests that a cross-sectional diversification discount may arise when
firms participate in distinct niches in the same broadly defined industry. Different firms may
experience different degrees of market maturity, and those operating in more mature sub-markets
are more likely to diversify and do so earlier. Alternatively, a “generalist” firm (Hannan and
Freeman, 1989) may respond to the demand maturity earlier by diversifying because it has
greater exposure to the overall market conditions, while a “specialist” may not do so if its
demand conditions are less affected by the overall market maturity. In either case, such profitmaximizing diversifying firms suffer the triple blow of facing a less attractive demand
environment with the decline in size of their original market, the diminished effectiveness of
their capabilities as these capabilities are applied to related, but distinct, product markets, and the
spreading of non-scale free capabilities across more segments.
The current theoretical model provides a conceptual basis for subsequent empirical
analysis to sort out the different arguments regarding the self-selection mechanism in the
diversification process. We make distinct empirical predictions from the existing corporate
finance literature regarding which firms (more or less capable) are more or less diversified.
Existing industry-level studies, such as Klepper and Simons’s (2000) work on the TV receiver
industry, are broadly consistent with the arguments developed here. As commercial broadcasting
began after World War II, the demand for TV receivers took off rapidly and attracted a flood of
entrants (through 1989 a total of 177 US firms), many of which came from the radio industry.
Klepper and Simons (2000) find that a greater degree of radio experience, measured by firm size,
types of radios, and years of production, significantly increased the likelihood and speed of entry.
Thus, radio producers appear to diversify into the TV receiver industry as a response to the
growth of the TV market, and the relative maturity of the radio market; furthermore, if we
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interpret more experience as evidence of more capabilities, then the results suggest that firms
with more capabilities tend to diversify earlier.
As a more general methodological note, it is worth observing that research on the
relationship between prior experience/capabilities and entry based on a fine-grained industry
classification is able to offer more refined measures of firms’ skills and capabilities than crossindustry analysis that inevitably must rely on more coarse-grained data. Thus, the analysis that
contrasts de novo entrants versus de alia entrants, such as Klepper and Simons (2000), Carroll et
al. (1996), and Helfat and Lieberman (2002), offers an important window to a capability-based
logic of diversification. Along these lines, more refined empirical analyses allow for measures of
market demand that more closely correspond to the actual product market conditions that firms
face. Even industry classification at the four-digit SIC level may incorporate many rather distinct
submarkets with quite different demand patterns.13 This more refined sort of empirical analysis
appears necessary to further unpack the critical elements of firm heterogeneity which results in
firms being “sorted” into diversification activity. Is the sorting into diversification activity based
on exogenous market maturity and a high level of non-scale free capabilities that have lost their
value in their current application as suggested here; or is the differential sorting into
diversification driven by low levels of firm capabilities and correspondingly relatively ex-ante
weak performance as suggested by recent writings in the corporate finance literature (e.g.,
Gomes and Livdan, 2004)?

13

As an illustration of the heterogeneity within a four-digit SIC class, consider the cardiovascular medical device
industry. Although this industry is mainly underneath primary SIC 3841 (surgical and medical instruments and
apparatus) and 3845 (electromedical and electrotherapeutic apparatus), the relevant demand conditions for a given
manufacturer are far more nuanced than a four-digit measure would provide because there exist eight independent
product sub-markets, such as stents, pacemakers, and heart valves, that have experienced very different industry life
cycles (Wu, 2009).
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Identifying the crucial role of opportunity cost of resource allocation provides an
alternative, economic-based explanation for the reluctance of established firms to aggressively
enter new domains as identified by Christensen (1997) in the context of his work on the disk
industry. The established firms in the disk drive industry faced a critical choice as to how to
allocate their valuable product development teams in the face of brutal competition with rapid
model introductions in their existing technological platforms or to introduce drives with an
alternative format. Based on the relative size of the market for their current family of drives, as
compared to the emerging market for smaller drives and ex-ante assessments of the growth rates
of these alternative technologies, straightforward opportunity cost logic could argue for the
apparent inertia of the established firms.
The notion of opportunity cost is a powerful concept. Perhaps its basic and pervasive
nature may cause us to ignore, or at least under-play, its role. Diversification is not merely driven
by supply-side considerations of rare and distinctive resources, but is equally impacted by the
market opportunities to which these resources may be applied. Ultimately, we need to develop
explicit characterizations of these “supply side” dynamics of firms’ capabilities in conjunction
with analyses of the competitive dynamics of product market competition. Both the investment
in capabilities, as well as their allocation across contexts, is a function of firms’ perception of
their demand environments and the competitive conditions they face. Recent work has rightly
highlighted the endogeneity of diversification decisions. However, in capturing the basis of this
endogeneity, it is important to leverage our existing insights regarding corporate diversification.
The economic logic of the allocation of non-scale free capabilities over alternative domains
builds on traditional capability-based views of the firm and provides a basis for endogenous
diversification decisions consistent with existing and emerging empirical findings.
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Table 1: Dimensions of capabilities
High
fungibility

Low
fungibility

E.g., team of
auditors; power
generation
equipment

E.g., brand-name;
computer
operating system

E.g., personnel
with specific
technical expertise;
steel plant

E.g., patent;
customer
relationship

Non-scale-free (positive
opportunity cost)

Scale-free (zero
opportunity cost)

Figure 1: Capability asymmetry and demand threshold
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Figure 2: Change in profit margin along with relative demand
( aI  10 , bI  bN  1 , T1  2 , T2  1.5 , and (1   )  0.8 )

Figure 3: Change in profit margin along with relative demand
( a I  10 , bI  bN  1 , T1  2 , T2  0.5 , and (1   )  0.8 )
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APPENDIX 1
In proving Proposition 1, we first solve the interior solution (t I* , t N* ) to the maximization
problem (2) in the text when demand conditions are such that it is optimal for the firm to
diversify:14
t I* 

(1   ) s I
(1   ) s I  s N

and t N* 

sN
(1   ) s I  s N

Inserting (t I* , t N* ) into the profit margin of the diversification strategy  * in equation (3) in
the text, we can transform equation (3) as

*
pI sI  p N s N

[

sI s N
sN
sI
r
r
( pI 
)
( pN 
)]  2
pI s I  p N s N
 IT
pI s I  p N s N
(1   ) I T
pI s I  p N s N

r
(1   ) I T

Notice that the first term (in the square brackets) in the above equation is exactly the
weighted average of two focus strategies in equation (4) in the text. Therefore, equation (5) in the
text and thus Proposition 1 is proved. ■

14

It should be noted that while competitors’ cost efficiency does not affect the continuous allocation of non-scalefree capabilities to a certain segment in the Bertrand setting, it does influence the boundary conditions that
determine whether a firm chooses to enter a segment.
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APPENDIX 2
The Tobin’s q associated with the diversification strategy is
p s p s
q DIV  I I * N* N
r (k I  k N )
s
sI
where capital in each market is respectively k I*  I * and k N* 
.
 I Tt I
(1   ) I Tt N*
Note that (i) if all capabilities are focused in the initial market, then capital is k I 
(ii) if all capabilities are focused in the new market, then capital is k N 
k I* 
t N* 

1
1
k and k N*  * k N . Moreover, remember t I* 
* I
tI
tN
sN
(1   ) s I  s N

, so we have

(1   ) s I
(1   ) s I  s N

sI
;
 IT

sI
. Therefore,
(1   ) I T
and

sN
(1   ) s I
1
1
and *  1 
.
 1
*
tI
tN
(1   ) s I
sN

Therefore, the Tobin’s q associated with the diversification strategy can be transformed
as:
q DIV 

pI sI  pN sN

r (k I*  k N* )
pI sI  pN sN


r (k I  k N  k I

sN

(1   ) s I

 kN

(1   ) s I

sN

)

pI sI  pN sN


r(



pI sI  pN sN
1
1
r (k I *  k N * )
tI
tN

sI
sI
s

 I
 I T (1   ) I T  I T

sN
(1   ) s I



sN
(1   ) I T

(1   ) s I
sN

)

pI sI  pN sN
s
s s
r
(s I  N  2 I N )
 IT
1
1

Next, we specify the weighted average of two focused strategies, with capital required
s
sI
when all capabilities are focused in one market, k I  I and k N 
, as weights, as:
 IT
(1   ) I T
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rk N
pN sN
rk I
pI sI

rk I  rk N rk I
rk I  rk N rk N
p s  pN sN
pI sI  pN sN
 I I

s
r
r (k I  k N )
(s I  N )
1
 IT

q FOC 

Finally, we compare the Tobin’s q values associated with these two strategies by
examining their ratio:

q FOC
 1
q DIV

sI sN
1
s
sI  N
1 
2

Therefore, there exists a discount factor
sI s N
1 
s
sI  N
1 
2
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APPENDIX 3

The above figure indicates the best response curves when relative demand conditions are
such that both firms diversify in equilibrium. The solid line illustrates the reasons why firm 1’s
best response curve is neither continuous nor monotonic. Firm 1’s best response curve has small
jumps both when t2 I is around 0.2 and 0.8. The “jump” around the value of t2 I  0.2 stems from
the fact that when t2 I  0.2 , firm 2’s cost value is sufficiently high in the initial market that it is
not able to produce in the initial market. As a result, firm 1’s best response allocation of
capabilities has a jump up as t2 I increases and passes 0.2, because firm 2 begins to produce in
the initial market. Similarly, when t2 I  0.82 , firm 2’s cost is too high in the new market to be
viable and produce a non-zero quantity. As a result, firm 1’s best response allocation of
capabilities jumps up as t2 I increases and passes 0.82, because at that point firm 2 exits
participation in the new market and, as a result, firm 1 does not need to put so many capabilities
into the new market.
Similarly, the dotted line illustrates the reasons why firm 2’s best response curve is
neither continuous nor monotonic. When t1I  0.6 , firm 2’s best response curve jumps from 0 to
0.42. This jump stems from firm 2’s entry into the new market. In addition, Firm 2’s best
response curve has a small jump when t1I  0.1 . This “jump” stems from the fact that
when t1I  0.1 , firm 1’s cost value is sufficiently high in the initial market that it is not able to
produce in the initial market. As a result, firm 2’s best response allocation has a jump up as t1I
increases and passes 0.1, because firm 1 begins to produce in the initial market.
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APPENDIX 4
Note that to capture the change in relative demand, without loss of generality, for all the
analyses, we hold constant the size of the initial market aI and only vary the size of the new
market aN . Let P1  P ( a N , T1 , T2 , t1I , t2 I ) be firm 1’s profit function given the new market size aN ,
firm 1’s capability T1 , the competitor firm 2’s capability T2 , firm 1’s allocation t1I , and the
competitor firm 2’s allocation t2 I . Similarly, P2  P ( aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I , t1I ) represents firm 2’s profit
function given the new market size aN , firm 2’s capability T2 , the competitor firm 1’s capability
T1 , firm 2’s allocation t2 I , and the competitor firm 1’s allocation t1I . Note that
P(aN , T1 , T2 , t1I , t2 I )  1I  1N and P (aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I , t1I )   2 I   2 N , where,

 im

 am  c(3i ) m  2cim

3bm

2
 bm ( qim ) and qim  
am  cim


2bm

, if q(3i ) m  0
for i  1, 2; m  I , N

(A1)

, if q(3i ) m  0

Below we restate Proposition 2a by characterizing the properties of the best response
curves. Moreover, without loss of generality, we fix the capability level of firm 1 and vary the
capability level of firm 2 ( T2  T ).
Proposition 2a: Let T2  T . There exists an aˆ N  0,  0, and   0 , such that
P (aN , T1 , T , t1I ,1) reaches maximum at some t1I  t (aN , T1 )  1 and P (aN , T , T1 , t2 I , t (aN , T1 )) has a
unique maximum at t2 I  1 , whenever aˆ N  aN  aˆ N   and T1  T   .

We start by proving when aN is small enough, there is a unique equilibrium
( t1I  1, t2 I  1 ), or both firms focus on the initial market.
Lemma 1: Given any T1 and T2 , there exists an a N such that when aN  a N , P1 has a unique
maximum at t1I  1 for all t2 I and P2 has a unique maximum at t2 I  1 for all t1I .
Proof: We provide the proof for P1 , and that for P2 is analogous. Note that q1N  0 and thus
1
because
1N  bN (q1N ) 2  0 for all t2 I whenever t1I  1 
aN (1   ) T1
1
c1N 
 aN  pN ; in other words, firm 1’s marginal cost in the new market is
(1   ) (1  t1I )T1
always greater than the maximal possible price unless firm 1 allocates enough capability to the
1
). This result together with the fact that q1I is strictly
new market (i.e., 1  t1I 
aN (1   ) T1
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1
,1] implies that P1  1I  1N  1I  0  bI (q1I ) 2 is strictly
aN (1   ) T1
1
increasing in t1I on [1 
,1] .
aN (1   ) T1

increasing in t1I on [1 

Note that when c we have q1N  0 and hence that P1  bI (q1I ) 2 is increasing in t1I on [0,
1] (since q1I is increasing in t1I ). Thus, when aN  0 , P1 has a unique maximum at t1I  1 for
all t2 I . This result implies that there exists an a N such that when aN  a N P1 has a unique
maximum at t1I  1 for all t2 I , provided that P1 is continuously increasing in aN for
1
t1I  [0,1 
] and is constant with respect to the changes of aN for
aN (1   ) T1
1
,1] (this later condition implies that P1 is still strictly increasing in t1I on
t1I  [1 
aN (1   ) T1
1
[1 
,1] , as proved in the previous paragraph). ■
aN (1   ) T1
Lemma 1 immediately implies that when aN is small enough, (t1I , t2 I )  (1,1) , or both
firms focusing on the initial market, is the unique equilibrium.
We then prove that when the new market gets sufficiently large and two firms’ capability
asymmetry is small enough, either firm may first diversify while the other stays focused at the
initial market.
In so doing, we first prove a lemma to show that if it is optimal for firm 1 to choose
t1I  1 given some t2 I , it must be still optimal for firm 1 to choose t1I  1 given some t2 I  t2 I .
That is,
q q
 2 P1
q q
Lemma 2:
 2bI 1I 1I  2bN 1N 1N  0 .
t2 I t1I
t2 I t1I
t2 I t1I
Proof:

q
P1
q
 2bI q1I 1I  2bN q1N 1N ,
t1I
t1I
t1I

q1N q1N
 2 q1N
 2 P1
q1I q1I
 2 q1I
 2bI
 2bI q1I
 2bN
 2bN q1N
t1I t2 I
t1I t2 I
t1I t2 I
t1I t2 I
t1I t2 I
Lemma 2 follows because

 2 q1N
 2 q1I
q q
 0 and
 0 ; 1I 1I  0 and
t2 I t1I
t2 I t1I
t2 I t1I

q1N q1N
 0 (Easy to check from equation A1). ■
t2 I t1I

41

Therefore, if it is optimal to focus on the initial market when the competitor focuses on
the initial market ( t2 I  1 ), it must be still optimal to focus if the competitor diversifies into the
new market. Similarly this lemma applies to firm 2.
Lemma 3: Given T  0 , when the two firms have the same level of capabilities, that is
T1  T2  T , there exists an aˆ N  0 such that P(aˆ N , T , T , t1I ,1) has at least two maxima including
one at t1I  1 . P(aN , T , T , t1I ,1) has a unique maximum at t1I  1 whenever aN  aˆ N , and
P(aN , T , T , t1I ,1) reaches maximum at some t1I  t1I (aN )  1 whenever aN  aˆ N .
Proof: According to the argument in Lemma 1, it is easy to check that P(0, T , T , t1I ,1) is
increasing in t1I over [0,1] and is strictly increasing in t1I when t1I is close to 1. Thus, when aN
is small enough, P(aN , T , T , t1I ,1) has a unique maximum at t1I  1 . Also, it is straightforward to
check that P(aN , T , T , t1I ,1)  P(aN , T , T ,1,1) for any t1I  1 when aN is big enough. This result
together with the fact that P(aN , T , T , t1I ,1) is continuous in aN implies that there exists a
threshold aˆ N  0 such that P(aˆ N , T , T , t1I ,1) has at least two maxima including one at t1I  1 .
2
P(aN , T , T , t1I ,1)  0 , which implies that P(aN , T , T , t1I ,1) has a unique
aN t1I
maximum at t1I  1 whenever aN  aˆ N and P(aN , T , T , t1I ,1) reaches maximum at some
t1I  t1I (aN )  1 whenever aN  aˆ N . ■
Note that:

Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 together imply the following corollary for all t2 I  1 .
Corollary 1: P(aˆ N , T , T , t1I , t2 I ) has a unique maximum at t1I  1 for all t2 I  1 .
Now we can prove Proposition 2(a):
Proof: Proposition 2a follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 3, and Corollary 1 and the fact that P is
differentiable with respect to all arguments. ■
Note that P (aN , T1 , T , t1I ,1) reaches maximum at some t1I  t (aN , T1 )  1 . This maximum is
not necessarily unique. There can be a unique maximum at t1I  0 , or a unique maximum
at 0  t1I  1 , or two maxima at both t1I  0 and some 0  t1I  1 . However, in any case,
Proposition 2a is proved in that, in equilibrium, either firm can diversify first (diversifies partly
into the new market or completely switches to the new market) while the other firm stays
focused in the initial market.
Below we restate Proposition 2b by characterizing the properties of the best response
curves. Moreover, without loss of generality, we let firm 2 be the less capable firm.
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Proposition 2b: Fixing T2 , there exists a T  0 , aN  0 , aN  0 , aN  aN , and   0
such that, when T1  T ,

i) P (aN , T1 , T2 , t1I ,1) has a unique maximum at t1I  1 for all aN  aN
 
ii) P (aN , T1 , T2 , t1I ,1) has a unique maximum at some 0  t1I  1 for all aN  (aN , aN   ) , and

iii) P(aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I ,1) has a unique maximum at t2 I  1 for all aN  aN

Proof: It is straightforward to see that, for firm 1, there exists an aN  0 such that

P (aN , T1 , T2 , t1I ,1) has a maximum at t1I  1 and a maximum at some t1I  1 . Similar to the proof

2
P(aN , T1 , T2 , t1I ,1)  0 , so P (aN , T1 , T2 , t1I ,1) has a unique maximum at t1I  1
aN t1I

 
for all aN  aN , and P (aN , T1 , T2 , t1I ,1) reaches maximum at some t1I  1 for all aN  (aN , aN   )
(not necessarily unique, since there can be two maxima at both t1I  0 and some 0  t1I  1 ).

of Lemma 3,




Moreover, aN  0 satisfies P(aN , T1 , T2 , t1I ,1)  P(aN , T1 , T2 ,1,1) . That is,

1
2 2
1
1
2 2



) ( aN 
) 2 ( aI 
)
(1   ) (1  t1I )T1
 T2  t1I T1
 T2  T1



. It is easy to check that aN
9bI
4bN
9bI

approaches zero as T1 increases. In addition, as T1 increases, P (aN , T1 , T2 , t1I ,1) has a unique

maximum at some 0  t1I  1 , since t1I  0 can never be a maximum when aN approaches zero.
This fact implies that P (aN , T1 , T2 , t1I ,1) has a unique maximum at some 0  t1I  1 for
 
all aN  (aN , aN   ) .
( aI 


Similarly, for firm 2, it is straightforward to see that there exists an aN  0 such that

P(aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I ,1) has a maximum at t2 I  1 and a maximum at some t2 I  1 .


Namely, P(aN , T2 , T1 , t2 ,1)  P(aN , T2 , T1 ,1,1) . That is:

( aI 

1
2 2
1
1
2 2



) ( aN 
) 2 ( aI 
)
T1  t2 I T2
(1   ) (1  t2 I )T2
 T1  T2


.
9bI
4bN
9bI

2
P(aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I ,1)  0 , P(aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I ,1) has a unique maximum at t2 I  1 for all
aN t2 I


aN  aN . In addition, it is straightforward to check that aN approaches a constant as T1 increases.



Since aN approaches zero as T1 increases, aN  aN when T1 is large enough. Since P1 is

Since
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continuously increasing in T1 and P2 is continuously decreasing in T1 , there exists a T  0 ; for all



aN  aN  aN    aN , it is a unique equilibrium that 0  t1I  1 and t2 I  1 when T1  T .■
Below we restate Proposition 2c by characterizing the properties of the best response
curves. Moreover, without loss of generality, we let firm 2 be the less capable firm.
Proposition 2c: Given a I and T1 , there exists T  0 such that for any 0  T2  T and
0  t1I  1 , P(aN , T1 , T2 , t1I , t2 I ) achieves maximum at t2 I  0 or t2 I  1 .
Proof: Recall that the total profit of firm 2 is P (aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I , t1I )   2 I   2 N , where
am  c1m  2c2 m

, 0) , if q1m  0
 max(
3bm

2
for m  I , N
 2m  bm (q2m ) and q2 m  
a

c
m
2
m
max(
if q1m  0
, 0) ,

2bm
1
1
1
Given that c1I 
, c2 I 
, c1N 
, and
 t1I T1
 t2 I T2
(1   ) (1  t1I )T1
1
, it is easy to check the following are true:
c2 N 
(1   ) (1  t2 I )T2
1) q2 I (and hence  2I ) is increasing in t2 I and T2 . There exists t 2I I  [0,1] such that q2 I  0 (and
hence  2 I  0 ) for all t2 I  [0, t 2I I ) . The threshold t 2I I decreases in
small enough. t

I
2I

T2

and equals 1 when T2 is

does not change with aN .

2) q2 N (and hence  2 N ) is decreasing in t2 I , but increasing in T2 . There exists t 2NI  [0,1] such
that q2 N  0 (and hence  2 N  0 ) for all t2 I  ( t 2NI ,1] . The threshold t 2NI increases in aN and
approaches 1 as aN approaches infinity. t 2NI is increasing in T2 .
Therefore, there exists an a N  0 and a threshold T (a N )  0 such that t 2NI  (0,1) and
whenever 0  T2  T (a N ) we have t 2I I  t 2NI (since t 2I I is decreasing in T2 and t 2NI is increasing
in T2 as explained above) and  2 I (t2 I  1)   2 N (t2 I  0) (since  2 I (t2 I  1) is independent of aN
while  2 N (t2 I  0) is increasing in aN as explained above). This fact implies that given any aI ,
T1 , and t1I , firm 2’s total profit P (aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I , t1I )   2 I   2 N achieves maximum at t2 I  0 or
t2 I  1 for all aN  0 whenever T2  T (a N ) . This result clearly holds when aN  a N , since, by
the above definition of a N and T (a N ) , P (aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I , t1I )   2 I   2 N achieves maximum at
t2 I  0 . Next we prove this result for aN  a N and aN  a N respectively.
When aN  a N , we have t 2I I  t 2NI , since t 2I I does not change with aN and t 2NI increases
in aN . Therefore, P (aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I , t1I )   2 I   2 N achieves maximum at t2 I  0 or t2 I  1 because
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P (aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I , t1I )   2 I   2 N is strictly decreasing in t2 I on [0, t 2NI ) , is zero on [ t 2NI , t 2I I ] , and is
strictly increasing in t2 I on ( t 2I I ,1] .
When aN  a N , P (aN , T2 , T1 , 0, t1I )   2 N (aN , t2 I  0) is strictly greater than
P(aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I , t1I )   2 N (aN , t2 I )   2 I (t2 I ) for any t2 I  (0,1] , because
 2 N (aN , t2 I  0)  [ 2 N (aN , t2 I )   2 I (t2 I )] equals  2 N (aN , t2 I  0)   2 N (aN , t2 I )  0 for all

t2 I  (0, t 2I I ] , and is greater than  2 N (aN , t2 I  0)  [ 2 N (aN , t 2I I )   2 I (t2 I  1)]  0 for t2 I  ( t 2I I ,1]
(  2 N (aN , t2 I )   2 N (aN , t 2I I ) for t2 I  ( t 2I I ,1] since  2 N (aN , t2 I ) is decreasing in t2 I for

t2 I  ( t 2I I ,1] ;  2 I (t2 I )   2 I (t2 I  1) for t2 I  ( t 2I I ,1] since  2 I (t2 I ) is increasing in t2 I for
t2 I  ( t 2I I ,1] ).
Note that  2 N (aN , t2 I  0)  [ 2 N (aN , t 2I I )   2 I (t2 I  1)]  0 is because

 2 N (aN , t2 I  0)  [ 2 N (aN , t 2I I )   2 I (t2 I  1)] >
 2 N (a N , t2 I  0)  [ 2 N (a N , t 2I I )   2 I (t2 I  1)]   2 N (a N , t2 I  0)  [0   2 I (t2 I  1)]  0 , where the
first inequality holds because

2
P(aN , T2 , T1 , t2 I ,1)  0 and aN  a N , the equality holds due
aN t2 I

to the definition of a N (when aN  a N , t 2I I  t 2NI and  2 N (aN , t2 I )  0 for all t2 I  ( t 2NI ,1] ), and
the last inequality holds due to the definition of a N and T (a n ) .
Therefore, T (a N ) serves as an upper bound such that, given aI and T1 , the total profit of
firm 2 achieves maximum at t2 I  0 or t2 I  1 for any 0  T2  T (a N ) and 0  t1I  1 .■
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